This Note begins with an outline of the policy considerations favoring standing for private persons to challenge the decisions of prosecutors not to prosecute. 5 It then describes several types of statutes providing for "private challenges" and examines the constitutional problems with each. Adopting a methodology based on principles developed in the body of federal constitutional law, 6 the Note argues that, while private prosecution and court-ordered prosecution are constitutionally untenable, Congress and state legislatures may, consistent with the Constitution, provide for citizen standing to challenge prosecutorial inaction. Finally, the Note proposes a model statute that would allow a private person who is the victim of an alleged criminal act to make such a challenge. The statute would authorize a court, upon an appropriate finding, to issue a declaratory judgment that a prosecutor has abused his discretion not to prosecute. While this judgment would not require that a prosecution be commenced, it could be expected to create public pressure on the prosecutor, giving the plaintiff political leverage that he might not otherwise have. In addition, the statutory procedure would allow for a public airing of grievances and serve as a device for "signalling" executive abuse of discretion.
I. POLICY REASONS FOR ALLOWING PRIVATE CHALLENGES TO PROSECUTORIAL INACTION
Federal and state statutes typically require that "all prosecutions" be conducted by government officials.' This grant of authority invariably has been interpreted to mean that only government prosecutors have the authority to prosecute, rather than that the government must prosecute every lenge prosecutorial inaction. Several of the statutes provide simply for some form of judicial review. However, those that have produced judicial commentary have been construed as giving standing to private persons. See cases cited infra notes 33 and 110. None has been used by a court to review prosecutorial inaction sua sponte.
5. The Note does not offer an extended argument in favor of legal recognition of the interests of private individuals in criminal prosecutions. Instead, the focus of Section I is on the inadequacies of current forms of such recognition.
6. This federally based methodology reflects three significant characteristics of state constitutional jurisprudence. First, the structure of many state constitutions parallels the structure of the federal Constitution. See infra notes 70, 71, 74 and 84. Second, several states have made changes recently in the structure of their constitutions in order to reflect more explicitly the federal model of separation of powers. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. amend. XXIII (establishing, for the first time in the state's history, a criminal justice system located expressly within the executive branch). This amendment marked a significant change from the old procedure, under which state's attorneys were appointed exclusively by judges, and seemed to reflect a conscious concern with maintaining the independence of the prosecutor's office from the judicial branch. See Transcript of Connecticut Legislative Hearings on Proposed Amendment, March 5, 1984 (statement of Austin McGuigan, Chief State's Attorney, opposing the amendment). Finally, even where such structural parallels do not exist, state courts have exhibited a tendency to emulate federal separation of powers doctrine in determining the allocation of powers under their own state constitutions, see cases cited infra notes 66 and 70, perhaps because separation of powers law is most developed at the federal level.
7. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1982) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall-() prosecute for all offenses against the United States .... ").
[Vol. 97: 488 offense. 8 Thus, a prosecutor's discretion whether to initiate a criminal proceeding 9 may be thought of as the gap between the authority to prosecute a case and the actual prosecution of that case.' 0 Allowing prosecutors this area of discretion within which to formulate prosecutorial policy undoubtedly serves valuable purposes in the criminal justice system,"' but such discretion also holds the potential for abuse. 2 A number of systemic reforms have been proposed that, by rationalizing the process of deciding whether to prosecute, would retain many of the benefits of prosecutorial discretion while minimizing its dangers. 3 These proposals, if adopted, might well help to minimize abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the aggregate. Nevertheless, the criminal justice system still would be unable to address the individual concerns' of the party most 9. The prosecutor's discretion over whether to initiate criminal proceedings is only one aspect of his discretion, which also encompasses the decision of what to charge, whether to accept a plea to a lesser charge, and whether to file a motion to dismiss a charge already brought. See generally Abrams, Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1272 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
10. Cf R. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 31 (1977) ("Discretion [in the law generally], like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction."). Two distinct senses of discretion emerge from Dworkin's discussion: (1) discretion where there are no clear standards by which an official must make decisions; and (2) discretion where an official has final authority to make decisions that cannot be reviewed or reversed by any other official. See id. at 31-32. For more on this distinction, see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
11. Prosecutorial discretion facilitates the efficient allocation of limited prosecutorial, judicial, and penal resources. It also helps to individualize and humanize the criminal law, allowing the system to deal flexibly with laws that overlap, laws that have become antiquated, laws that are necessarily broad, and laws that are intended primarily to express social disapproval for particular behavior rather than to be consistently enforced. ) ("Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least favored members of the community-racial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the poor-will be treated most harshly."); see also K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 12 (1969) ("A startlingly high proportion of all official discretionary action pertaining to administration of justice is illegal or of doubtful legality.").
13. Two reforms in particular are worthy of note: (1) implementing specific administrative guidelines for the exercise of discretion, see, e.g., Abrams, 14. Obviously, victims of crimes suffer specific wrongs-death, physical and emotional harm, loss of property-that constitute real and lasting injuries, and those injuries are of greater concern to these victims than to the general population. likely to be dissatisfied with a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute-namely, the victim of the crime at issue. 15 The question then arises whether the state should give legal recognition to the interests of individual victims in the initiation of criminal prosecutions. In recent years, the dominant view has been that it should not. Two justifications are usually offered: first, that the criminal law is inherently a matter of public law, to be dealt with between the state and the defendant; 6 and second, that any interest individuals do have in dealing with individual criminal defendants may be satisfied more appropriately through civil legal action." However, neither justification seems warranted. Serious doubt has been raised both by writers within the victims' rights movement, who have advocated a larger role for victims in criminal proceedings,'" and by those who, in a much more general context, have questioned the very distinction between the "public" and "private" in law. 9 In addition, many criminal defendants are judgment proof, and even in cases where a defendant has a sufficiently "deep pocket" to give a victim an economic incentive to file suit, a victim still cannot achieve spevictim who most vigorously seeks full enforcement of the criminal law is the survivor of the deceased in a homicide case.").
15. Both the administrative guidelines approach and the written reasons approach would address abuses of discretion in the first sense described supra note 10 (i.e., discretion where there are no clear standards by which an official must make decisions), but not in the second sense (i.e., discretion where an official has final authority to make decisions that cannot be reviewed or reversed by any other official).
16. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 847 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Criminal prosecutorial decisions vindicate only intangible interests, common to society as a whole, in the enforcement of the criminal law. The conduct at issue has already occurred; all that remains is society's general interest in assuring that the guilty are punished."); cf. (1987) .
Moreover, a victim who feels that the criminal justice system is entirely unresponsive to his needs might in some extreme cases resort to "vigilante justice." Even worse, a widespread perception that the system is unresponsive might lead to public sentiment that such acts are justified. ). This suggests an important irony: the more representative the basis for a prosecutor's authority, the more urgent the need for effective checks on his discretion.
Moreover, only in rare cases will victims have the resources necessary to have a prosecutor removed and a new one elected in his place. In essence, the political remedy approach trivializes the fundamental role of the courts as a forum for those without viable political influence. Cf. J. MASHAW A number of states have enacted statutes that potentially allow victims to challenge the decisions of prosecutors not to prosecute. 2 " These statutes may be divided into two basic types, each of which raises its own set of concerns. First, "private prosecution" statutes, which allow private persons to conduct their own prosecutions, 2 9 raise concerns primarily about the rights of defendants 30 and, in addition, about the appropriateness of delegating an exclusively executive function to private parties. 1 Second, statutes that allow a court to order a prosecutor to proceed with a previistrative procedures available for plaintiff to object to plan for municipal bus routes). Second, courts will say that mandamus is available to compel only "ministerial" tasks, where official duty is clear, 26. See supra notes 23-25; see also Comment, supra note 23, at 213-15 (discussing inadequacy of alternatives to private prosecution).
27. Before adopting such a statute, a legislature would have to determine both the seriousness of prosecutorial abuse and the extent of public dissatisfaction with prosecutorial inaction in its jurisdiction. This Note does not explore that threshold policy discussion but rather suggests a procedure for private challenge to prosecutorial inaction that is constitutionally sound. 34, 192 N.E.2d 9 (1963) (criminal conviction need not be reversed solely because complaining lay witness was allowed to conduct prosecution); Comment, supra note 23, at 215 (advocating scheme whereby "court would have the power to appoint a privately hired attorney to act as the public prosecutor for a single action").
30. See infra Section II-A. 31. Challenges to statutes that allow private individuals to assume assertedly exclusive executive functions have been made recently in the administrative law context, but with little success so far. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 623-25 (D. Md. 1987) (citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act does not violate separation of powers). In Chesapeake Bay, the court considered explicitly the analogy to criminal prosecution and found that "the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion cautions [only] courts against interfering with the executive decisions concerning criminal prosecution." Id. at 624. Given the early history of private prosecution in this country, see infra note 39, there may be good precedent for this conclusion. Issues pertaining to the delegation of the prosecution function are raised in the discussion of separation of powers objections to courtordered prosecution statutes, see infra Section II-B.
[Vol. 97: 488 ously declined prosecution 2 or to appoint a special prosecutor to take control of a case 3 raise objections primarily concerning separation of powers, 34 and, ultimately, about due process as well. 5 Statutes providing for some combination of these procedures for redressing prosecutorial inaction 36 may contain all of the mentioned flaws.
A. Private Control of Prosecutions
Historically, private individuals often were able to bring prosecutions themselves. 37 Private prosecution still is practiced in England," and in Supp. 1986 ) (allowing a judge to appoint an "attorney" to act "as or in the place of' the county attorney), construed in State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1003 (1977) ("Arguably, a private citizen could petition the district court for action pursuant to this statute and the court could appoint a special prosecutor if it decided that this was necessary." (citations omitted)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-16-06 (1985) (if court finds that "state's attorney has refused or neglected to perform" it may appoint a different "attorney to take charge or' case), construed in Hennebry v. Hoy, 343 N.W.2d 87, 92 n.3 (N.D. 1983) (statute limits prosecutorial discretion in a "practical sense"); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-209 (1986) ("If after a hearing the judge finds that the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute was arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse, he may order the prosecuting attorney to file an information and prosecute the case or may appoint a special prosecutor to do so." (emphasis added) The primary problem with these statutes is that they compromise a criminal defendant's due process right to be prosecuted by a disinterested prosecutor. Several states have come to this conclusion only in recent years,' 4 1 and at least one state has maintained the position that the permissibility of private prosecution ought to turn on a case-by-case determination of whether a defendant's rights actually have been compromised. 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, acting in its supervisory capacity over the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, recently established a "categorical rule" against the appointment of an interested prosecutor. court is in a better position to control the . . . case by the exercise of discretion than in fashioning an absolute rule that in all cases or in no cases can such private attorney proceed.").
Even in New York, however, the rule has been that the district attorney must conduct criminal proceedings in "serious" cases (i.e., where the maximum penalty exceeds six months), the theory being that in more serious cases the "People the propriety of interested private counsel acting as prosecutors in federal criminal contempt proceedings arising out of alleged violations of an injunction in an underlying civil suit.** While stopping short of declaring that the due process clause absolutely guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial government prosecutor," 4 the Court found appointment of Vuitton's counsel in these circumstances to be "improper. '46 The Vuitton holding does not bind Congress or state legislatures to adopt the same categorical rule. Yet the Court's recognition of the significant dangers to defendants' rights resulting from private prosecution 47 cautions against retention of such procedures.
B. Judicial Supervision of the Prosecutor
In light of these due process concerns, statutes allowing courts to order the prosecutor to prosecute 8 or to appoint a special prosecutor 49 upon a finding of abuse of discretion appear an attractive alternative. Yet such procedures raise another constitutional problem: Prosecution typically is an executive branch function, 50 and allowing a judge the power of appointment, removal, or supervision over prosecutors threatens to diminish exclusively executive powers and to augment the constitutionally limited role of judicial authority.
Not every judicial appointment or removal of officials who exercise executive functions is prohibited. Under the federal constitution, the appointments clause 51 provides expressly that judges may appoint "inferior" executive officers when Congress so provides.
5 2 In addition, an analogous 44. Plaintiff Vuitton's private attorney was appointed by the court as a "special prosecutor" pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42(b) both to conduct an investigation (which included court-sanctioned undercover work) and to prosecute defendants for their violation of an injunction prohibiting infringement of plaintiff's trademark. Defendants ultimately received sentences ranging from six months to five years. Id. at 2128.
45. Justice Blackmun, however, in his brief concurrence, wrote that he would go even further than the Court's holding: "[T]he practice-federal or state-of appointing an interested party's counsel to prosecute for criminal contempt is a violation of due process." Id. at 2141 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also -1279) , the D.C. Circuit held, as its principal holding, that the independent counsel is not an inferior officer and therefore not appointable by a court. If it agrees that the Ethics Act is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court could follow this holding or it could go even further, as is suggested by the balance of the D.C. Circuit opinion, and find the independent counsel to be a core executive official and therefore not appointable even if an inferior officer.
Yet the Ethics Act provisions pose a particularly difficult constitutional puzzle; the Court could well uphold the Act as an exception to its traditional core powers jurisprudence. While judicial appointment and supervision of the independent counsel obviously threaten separation of powers, in this special case they also tend to reinforce the separation of powers by providing a means for dealing with unlawful conduct by members of the Executive Branch who, if prosecution were left to their superiors, otherwise might never be prosecuted. See id. at 22-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It is . .. Perhaps even more damaging to the constitutional scheme than diminishing executive power is the prospect of augmenting judicial power by giving courts the very powers taken from the executive. 6 Courts may not exercise power that is "incongruous" with their constitutionally prescribed role, 6 ' and few powers are more incongruous with the judicial power than the prosecutorial. 2 Private challenge statutes that allow courts to order a prosecutor to proceed or to appoint a special prosecutor to take his place both diminish core executive power and augment judicial power. They should, therefore, be rejected as constitutionally unsound. 6 operates as a means of maintaining the executive's proper-and properly circumscribed-constitutional role." (footnote omitted)). However the Court decides, it is unlikely to tamper with the main of its long-standing core functions jurisprudence.
58. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 UJ. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of James Madison) ("I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing and controlling those who execute the law.").
59. Even Justice White, the Court's most prominent pragmatist on separation of powers, is likely to agree with this characterization. 63. Moreover, in the process of the criminal law, perhaps more than in any other area of law, a strict separation of powers is justified by the protections it provides for defendants' rights. For the judiciary to supervise a prosecution and to preside over that prosecution not only violates separation of powers but also may violate due process. Despite the official doctrine of Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
III. A PROPOSAL: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL

ABUSE OF DISCRETION
If due process concerns (primarily) prohibit privately controlled prosecution, and if the doctrine of separation of powers (primarily) prohibits judicially ordered or controlled prosecution, relief for victims seeking criminal prosecution is very limited. However, even though the executive does have constitutionally exclusive authority to prosecute, its discretion not to use that authority is reviewable. A legislature may establish a procedure by which individuals may challenge executive inaction and obtain a declaratory judgment if a court finds abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
A. Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Inaction
The 67. In fact, Cox is a much more subtle and complicated case than many of the citations to it, and particularly to the dictum quoted above, would suggest. In addition to the majority opinion there are Examination of the constitutional locus of the executive's prosecutorial power reveals that a statutory grant of judicial review would be constitutionally permissible.
The "Take Care" Clause and Judicial Review
The constitutional basis for the power to prosecute is thought to inhere in the power granted by article II, section 3, clause 4, which provides that the President shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." ' 68 While the United States Constitution makes no explicit mention of the prosecution function, many state constitutions do make specific provision for the exercise of the prosecutorial power. 69 Such state prosecutorial power also is governed in many cases by the standard of the take care clause, 70 an analogue of which is present in virtually all of the various state constitutions. 1 The take care clause exhibits two significant characteristics: First, it is a positive grant of power, a power to act, not a power not to act, a "duty, not a license." 2 This fact is made particularly clear by the "faithfully" standard it carries. Second, the specific content of the executive's take care three separate concurrences, each of which characterizes the issues of prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers differently. For example, while the majority holds that a judge could not order a prosecution to proceed against the wishes of the prosecutor, 342 F.2d at 172, one concurrence suggests that a grand jury could so order, id. at 184 (Brown, J., concurring). Further, even though the constitutions of many states specify that the take care clause applies to the state's chief executive, see, e.g., Wyo. CONST., art. IV, § 4 ("The Governor ... shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed"), these states' courts have applied this mandate to local prosecutors as well, see, e.g., In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1984) (arguing that "the executive function is to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'" and, since "[ihe county and prosecuting attorney is a member of the executive branch of government," he takes his constitutional authority from the take care clause). This is the case despite the fact that prosecutors in most states are directly elected, see, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 9-1-802 (1987) (district attorneys independently elected in each district), and that prosecutorial power does not always flow directly and fully from the governor's office, see A. GOLD-STEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 69 (1981) (discussing implications of decentralization for judicial deference).
71. (1985) ("The 'take Care' clause is a duty, not a license; it imposes an obligation on the President to enforce duly enacted laws.").
power is supplied by a body of statutes. This is so even in the case of "core" functions like prosecution. 7 3 These statutes are enacted by the legislature as holder of the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [all] Powers vested," inter alia, in the executive. 7 4
The juxtaposition of these two central constitutional clauses suggests the legislature's large role in shaping what the executive can and cannot do. Thus, while the grand structure of the Constitution requires that the legislature give the prosecutorial power exclusively to the executive, the necessary and proper clause allows the legislature to determine the actual shape of that power. But does this "shaping" function include the power to limit the executive's power not to act? In Heckler v. Chaney, 77 the Supreme Court said expressly that judicial review may be prescribed:
The general exception to reviewability . . . remains a narrow one, but within that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated otherwise. In so holding, we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable. 
Prosecution as a Reviewable Executive Function
While administrative enforcement authority and prosecutorial power both are based on the take care clause, that fact alone does not establish the legislature's right to provide for review of prosecutorial inaction as it may for review of administrative inaction." 3 The crucial question is whether there is any constitutional basis upon which reviewability of the two powers can be distinguished.
The only discernable difference seems to be that in the criminal law the executive also has the pardon power,"' a power in some ways analogous to a "power" not to prosecute. 85 Since Congress is forbidden from legislating review of pardons, 6 it thus might be thought that nonprosecution also is unreviewable.
Undoubtedly, the prosecutorial power and the pardon power complement each other, 87 further indicating that prosecution is a core executive function. Yet the pardon power is very different from any "nonprosecution power." The pardon power is a positive grant of constitutional authority; its uses are infrequent and narrow. 83. One objection may be that there are greater practical problems with review of the former than of the latter. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 ("[Tlhe decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis that courts are competent to undertake."). But see A. GOLDSTrEN, supra note 70, at 55 (prosecutorial context is "familiar" one involving questions "integral to the judge's function").
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (President has the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"). Nearly all the state constitutions grant to the governor (often together with a board of review) the power to pardon. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. V, §14; R.I. CONST. art VII, §4; UTAH CONST. art. VII, §12.
85. This analogy has led one commentator to suggest that the prosecutorial power itself derives from the pardon power. See Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 800, 812 n.160 (1987) (take care clause is "at most a modest grant of power"; presidential power rests primarily on other clauses of article II).
86. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) ("A fair reading of the history of the English pardoning power, from which our Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, derives, of the language of that clause itself, and of the unbroken practice since 1790 compels the conclusion that the power flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress.").
87 9 With the exception of impeachable offenses, the executive may pardon any offense, at any time. 90 Most important, for a pardon to have any effect, it requires an affirmative public act." 1 By contrast, there is no positive grant of nonprosecution power in the Constitution; this "power" is simply the nonuse of the take care clause prosecutorial power. Nonprosecution requires no affirmative act and may be reversed at any time. The power not to prosecute is in no way inherent in the power to prosecute; no matter how unwise a policy it might be, one can imagine a legislature eliminating discretion by calling for full enforcement.
2 Despite its great importance to the functioning of the criminal law, 9 " prosecutorial discretion is simply a judicial construction, timehonored by legislative acquiescence.
9 4
The "nonprosecution power" is accepted in part because the executive always has the option to use the pardon power to put the possibility of prosecuting a particular individual beyond question. But the very affirmative, irreversible, and public nature of a pardon may make it the focus of public scrutiny.
5 It is much safer for the executive simply not to prose-
[or] to reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years . 
B. Constitutionally Permissible Judicial Action: The Declaratory Judgment
With statutory authorization, courts may review prosecutors' decisions not to prosecute. 9 However, they may go no further: Even upon a finding of abuse of discretion, the separation of powers doctrine prevents courts from ordering prosecution or taking over the prosecutorial function. 7 To answer the claims of victims who wish to challenge prosecutorial inaction, courts should be authorized to issue declaratory judgments that prosecutors have abused their discretion.
A declaratory judgment is used to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." ' 98 Since it declares legal rights arising out of a real case or controversy, a declaratory judgment is not an advisory opinion. 99 Having issued a declaratory judgment that a prosecutor has abused his discretion in declining to prosecute, 0 0 a court would have good reason to "assume" that the prosecutor subsequently might change his mind and satisfy his obligations under the take care clause. 10 1 While a court would have no formal contempt power to order the prosecutor to prosecute, a plaintiff armed with a declaratory judgment would possess a kind of political power otherwise unavailable to him as private citizen and victim." 0 2 Even were the prosecutor to remain steadfast in his refusal to prosecute, the declaratory judgment still would have served an important "signalling" function. 10 3
C. Mechanics of the Proposed Statute
Under the proposed statute, a person' could challenge the decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute a criminal prosecution. To have standing to make such a challenge, the person would have to demonstrate that he was directly affected by the decision not to prosecute.' 05 As in the civil law, the standing requirement would ensure adjudication of a genuine case or controversy.0' In addition, the standing requirement would prevent harassment and vindictive actions by persons who have not been directly affected by alleged criminal action.
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Filing of the complaint would be followed by an in camera hearing' 0 7 attended by a judge, the complainant, and the prosecutor who refused to bring the prosecution. On the motion of the prosecutor, a portion of the hearing also could be held ex parte.' 0 8 The purpose of the hearing would be to consider only the question of whether the prosecutor had abused his discretion in refusing to bring a prosecution. 10 9 Review never would be de novo." 0 This deferential standard would minimize the possibility that judicial review might undermine the primacy of the prosecutor's office; the executive would retain broad discretion in allocating resources and in setting enforcement priorities. In addition, the deferential standard of review and the standing requirement would help prevent any significant increases in caseload."' If the court were to find that the prosecutor had abused his discretion, the court would issue a declaratory judgment to that effect.
107. The secrecy of the proceedings would serve two functions. First, it would protect the reputation of an accused until such time as a prosecution actually was commenced. Second, it would allow a prosecutor to present sensitive evidence to a judge, for example, that he chose not to pursue a particular prosecution because the investigation into an alleged criminal act fit into a larger, possibly undercover, investigative scheme that required the prosecutor's office to refrain from prosecuting at a particular time. 108. This procedure would allow for cases where the evidence was of such a secretive nature that revealing it to a complainant would be objectionable to the prosecutor.
109. Reasons that the prosecutor might offer in defending his decision not to prosecute are suggested by the considerations a federal prosecutor is required to weigh in determining whether to prosecute: (a) federal law enforcement priorities; (b) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (c) the deterrent effect of prosecution; (d) the accused's culpability in connection with the offense; (e) the accused's history of criminal activity; (f) the accused's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others; and (g) probable sentence or other consequences if the accused is convicted. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 7 (1980). A prosecutor would be deemed to have abused his discretion if his decision not to prosecute either failed to take into account factors similar to these, or if it considered improper factors, including the defendant's race, sex, religion, national origin, or political association, the prosecutor's feelings concerning the defendant or the victim, or the possible effect of the decision on the prosecutor's professional or personal circumstances. West 1985) , violated the state's constitutional doctrine of separation of powers by not only providing for judicial review of a prosecutor's inaction-a procedure which, the court implied, see id. at 134-35, 401 N.W.2d at 789, by itself might be constitutional-but also permitting a de novo judicial examination of the merits of the case).
111. It is difficult to predict how many cases and what additional costs would result from passage of the proposed statute. As mentioned supra note 4, previous private challenge statutes have made a negligible contribution to court dockets. Nonetheless, it is possible that a well-publicized and wellformulated statute would increase a court's caseload significantly. Moreover, the costs of added hearings and other proceedings could impose an additional budgetary strain on prosecutors' offices. In anticipation of such costs, a legislature could tailor the statute to limit the availability of judicial review to serious felony cases or to repeat offender crimes of the sort mentioned supra note 22. The extent to which the costs of this scheme might outweigh its benefits is a question of allocation of social resources that could be fully informed only by empirical study.
IV. CONCLUSION
The model statute offered in this Note provides legislatures with a mechanism for a constitutionally firm recognition of the interest of private individuals in the initiation of criminal proceedings. It guards against harassment and unfair treatment of defendants through its limited scope and procedural safeguards. In addition, it restricts a court's role to one of review, thereby maintaining prosecution as an exclusively executive function. Allowing private individuals to obtain a declaratory judgment that a prosecutor has abused his discretion will provide a signal that the prosecutor has been "unfaithful" in the execution of his duties. Ultimately, the scheme should promote broader public confidence in the criminal justice system.
